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INTRODUCTION

Since its first "official" recognition as a concept of international law
in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the "Vienna
Convention"),' jus cogenS2 has had both a strikingly unremarkable and a
highly controversial existence. On the one hand, its impact on the actual
practice of international law and, more specifically, the rulings of
international and domestic tribunals, has been particularly limited. On
the other hand, however, jus cogens has triggered a lively debate whose
controversial character resembles, in several respects, the lex mercatoria
-4
discussion in international commercial law.
The existing literature on the topic reflects this ambivalent nature of
the jus cogens concept. A significant portion of the-especially earlywritings on this topic criticize the vagueness, 5 emptiness, 6 uselessness, 7
and potential for political abuse' of the jus cogens concept, as well as the
inadequacy of its conceptual bases, 9 thereby challenging the very
1. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331. As
of 3 August 2010, 111 States were Parties to the Convention.
2. The literal translation of this Latin phrase is "compelling law."
3. See infra, I.B. and I.C.
4. In fact, critics of jus cogens argue that this concept is vague, empty and even
inexistent in a manner that is similar to the way in which the opponents of the lex
mercatoria doctrine object to the notion of an autonomous transnational law of
international trade. The idea of a new lex mercatoriawas first expressed by Schmitthoff
and Goldman in the 1950s and 60s. For a more recent critical discussion of this doctrine,
see, e.g. Vanessa L.D. Wilkinson, The New Lex Mercatoria-Reality or Academic
Fantasy? 12 J. INT'L AtB. 103 (1995); Christopher W.O. Stoecker, The Lex Mercatoria:
To what Extent does it Exist? 7 J. INT'L ARB. 101 (1990).
5. Georg Schwarzenberger, International Jus Cogens? 43 TEX. L. REV. 455, 469
(1964-1965) (stating that the application of the vague concept of jus cogens may be
detrimental to international cooperation); Egon Schwelb, Some Aspects of International
Jus Cogens as Formulatedby the InternationalLaw Commission, 61 AM. J. INT'L. L. 946
(1967).
6. A. Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus Cogens, As Illustrated
by the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina,17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (1995-1996).
7. See Anthony D'Amato, It's a Bird, It's a Plane, It's Jus Cogens, 6 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 2, 6 (1990-1991) (asking for a theory that explains "the utility of a norm ofjus
cogens").
8. Schwelb, supra note 5, at 948 (referring to the "dangers" of the concept of
international jus cogens); Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests
Fundamental to InternationalSociety, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 585, 591 (1987-1998) (referring
to the "concealed uses" and "dangers" of jus cogens); Dean Adams, The Prohibitionof
WidespreadRape as a Jus Cogens, 6 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 357 (2004-2005).
9. The most frequently criticized conceptual defect of jus cogens is the allegedly
inappropriate analogy with the concept of domestic public policy. See Gennady M.
Danilenko, InternationalJus Cogens: Issues of Law-Making, 2 EUR. J. INT'L L. 42, 44
(1991) (stating that "the elaboration of a coherent theory of jus cogens remains a
predominant challenge for the international community."); Weisburd, supra note 6, at 27
(concluding that "the genesis of thejus cogens concept rests on what must be considered
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existence of the notion of jus cogens. Other authors, on the contrary,
have sought to defend the usefulness of this concept and suggested
definitions containing detailed criteria allowing the establishment of the
jus cogens character of specific norms.'o Again, others implicitly
recognize the existence and "workability" of the jus cogens concept in
their attempts to determine the jus cogens nature of particular rules of
international law."
More recently, the debate has shifted from the initial dispute
pertaining to the usefulness and necessity of introducing the jus cogens
concept into the realm of the law of treaties to attempts to identify novel,
more appropriate, theoretical foundations 2 and discussions of a possible
application beyond the scope of the Vienna Convention. In this respect,
the richest and most topical debate consists of doctrinal suggestions
advocating, or opposing, the unavailability of the sovereign immunity
defense with respect to claims alleging jus cogens violations.' 3 Other
suggestions include the potential impact that jus cogens violations may
have on the law of State responsibility 4 and jurisdiction.' 5

fundamental intellectual confusion"); Weisburd, supra note 6, at 51 (observing that "[a]s
part of the international legal system ... [jus cogens] is a source of confusion and
distraction"); Christenson, supra note 8, at 598 (discussing the "flaws" of the municipal
law analogy of public order).
10. See Walter Gangl, The Jus Cogens Dimensions of Nuclear Technology, 13
CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 63 (1980); Karen Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens:
Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 411 (19881989); Eva M. Komicker Uhlmann, State Community Interests, Jus Cogens and
Protection of the Global Environment: Developing Criteriafor Peremptory Norms, 11
GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 101 (1998-1999); Lisa Yarwood, Jus Cogens: Usefool Tool or
PassingFancy? A Modest Attempt at Definition, 38 B. L. J. 16 (2006).
11. See Gangl, supra note 10; Carin Kahgan, Jus Cogens and the Inherent Right to
Self-Defense, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 767 (1996-1997); Jean Allain, The jus cogens
Nature of non-refoulement, 13 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 533 (2001).
12. Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34
YALE J. INT'L L. 331 (2009) (rejecting positivism, natural law and the public-policy
analogy as conceptual bases for thejus cogens doctrine).
13. Andreas Zimmermann, Sovereign Immunity and Violations of InternationalJus
Cogens-Some CriticalRemarks, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 433 (1994-1995); Jack Alan Levy,
Note, As Between Princz and King: Reassessing the Law of Foreign Sovereign Immunity
as Applied to Jus Cogens Violators, 86 GEO. L.J. 2703 (1997-1998); Loma McGregor,
State Immunity and Jus Cogens, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 437 (2006); Lee M. Caplan, State
Immunity, Human Rights, and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the Normative Hierarchy
Theory, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 741 (2003); Thora A. Johnson, A Violation of Jus Cogens
Norms as an Implicit Waiver of Immunity under the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act,
19 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 259 (1995); Riccardo Pavoni & Stiphane Beaulac,
L'immunitd des Etats et le jus cogens en droit international. Etude crois~e
Italie/Canada,43 R.J.T. ns 491 (2009); Xiaodong Yang, Jus Cogens and State Immunity,
3 N.Z. Y.B. INT'L L. 131 (2006).
14. See Alexander Orakhelashvili, Peremptory Norms and Reparation for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, 3 BALTIC Y.B. INT'L L. 19 (2003).
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All those academic discussions of jus cogens share a common
approach, namely the fact that their criticisms of, support for, and overall
analysis ofjus cogens invariably relate to the practical usefulness of this
concept, whether present or future, as a rule of international law. While
their concern with practical meaningfulness is legitimate, it overlooks, in
my opinion, that the relevance of jus cogens is not restricted to its
application by international and domestic tribunals, or its invocation in
international negotiations. On the contrary, as I will show, the true
import of the recognition of the concept of jus cogens lies more in its
"symbolic"' 6 value and its "vision" of international law and the
international legal system. 7
The fact that, in essence, jus cogens constitutes a statement on the
nature of the international legal order does not imply that this concept is
devoid of any practical significance. However, such significance does
not lie in the actual application, by international or domestic tribunals, of
this concept itself, but in the acceptance, by the international community,
of specific features of the international legal system. In fact, agreement
on those characteristics provides a theoretical foundation for the
progressive implementation-in the development of international lawof the basic vision expressed by the concept of jus cogens. Thus, jus
cogens should not be viewed as a norm of international law properly
speaking, but rather as a basic idea or principle which has exercised, and
continues to exercise, considerable influence on the international lawmaking process.
In this article, I pursue a twofold purpose. First, I aim to
demonstrate that the fundamental progress achieved by the recognition of
the concept of jus cogens lies in the implicit acceptance of a particular
vision of international law, rather than in the few isolated and debatable
references in the case law of international and domestic tribunals. I use
the term "vision" to denote the idea that the implications of the concept
of jus cogens have not yet fully been recognized, but are progressively
15. Some authors argue that violations of jus cogens norms should, irrespective of
specific treaty provisions to this effect, be subject to universal jurisdiction. See, e.g., M.
Cherif Bassiouni, Accountability ofInternationalCrime and Serious Violations offHuman
Rights: International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 59 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (1996); David S. Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International
HumanitarianLaw as a Norm of Jus Cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 219 (2004-2005); Alfred P. Rubin, Actio Popularis, Jus Cogens and Offenses

Erga Omnes? 35 NEw ENG. L. REv. 265 (2000-2001).
16. See Hilary Charlesworth & Christine Chinkin, The Gender of Jus Cogens, 15
HUM. RTs. Q. 63, 66 (1993) (stating that "[m]uch of the importance of the jus cogens
doctrine lies not in its practical application but in its symbolic significance in the
international legal process").
17. Thatjus cogens constitutes, or is based on, a specific vision of international law
is affirmed by some writers. See, e.g., Christenson, supra note 8, at 590.
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implemented in the international law-making process. Second, I attempt
to explain what this vision consists of, and how it has impacted, or at
least contributed to, the post-Vienna Convention development of
international law.
Accordingly, in Part One, I challenge the widely accepted
perception (and fact) thatjus cogens constitutes a norm of international
law. I argue that several basic conceptual and theoretical flaws of jus
cogens deprive this concept of its quality as a rule of international law.
In support of this view, I rely on the observation that jus cogens is
In
largely irrelevant for the actual practice of international law.'
particular, I highlight the limited recourse to this concept in the context
of the law of treaties, as well as the inappropriate attempts to apply jus
cogens beyond the scope assigned to it in the Vienna Convention.
In Part Two, I explain the conceptual implications ofjus cogens for
the nature of the international legal system and argue that those
implications consist of the existence of fundamental values of the
international community, the necessity of a hierarchy of norms as a
means to protect those values, and a (limited) rejection of the consentbased approach to the sources of international law. On the basis of this
observation, I explain how this 'jus cogens vision" of the international
legal system has impacted, or contributed to, the post-Vienna Convention
development of international law. More specifically, I argue that jus
cogens has facilitated acceptance of individual rights as fundamental
values of the international legal order and helped improve the judicial
protection of such values, partly against State will.
THE INAPPROPRIATENESS OF CHARACTERIZING JUS COGENS AS A

I.

RULE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LIMITED RELEVANCE OF
JUS COGENS FOR THE PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Fundamental Conceptualand TheoreticalFlaws of Jus Cogens

A.

1.

Origins of Jus Cogens

If the concept of jus cogens was, for the first time, officially
recognized in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it had
nevertheless been the subject of prior academic debate throughout the
first half of the 2 0 th century. In fact, without expressly referring to the
notion ofjus cogens, a number of writers during the 1920s discussed the

18.

See, e.g., Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Has the Nature of International Law

Changed? Le Plus Ca Change. . ., 8 AUSTRIAN REV. INT'L & EUR. L. 221, 223 (2003).
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existence of such superior norms when advancing claims that treaties,
like contracts, should be void if contravening certain fundamental rules.' 9
The probably first comprehensive discussion ofjus cogens consists
of a 1937 article authored by Alfred von Verdross. 2 0 In this influential
publication, Verdross argued that "[n]o juridical order can ... admit
treaties between juridical subjects, which are obviously in contradiction
to the ethics of a certain community," 2 1thereby emphasizing the "natural
law" or "moral" foundation of jus cogens norms. In fact, according to
Verdross, every legal order "has its roots in the ethics of a certain
community" 22 and it "cannot be understood apart from its moral basis." 23
By 1953, the academic discussions of jus cogens had provided a
solid enough foundation for the International Law Commission to
conclude that "there exist in the general positive international law of
today certain fundamental rules of international public order contrary to
which States may not validly contract."2 4 While this finding prepared the
ground for the eventual inclusion of ajus cogens provision in the Vienna
Convention, the concept remained controversial. If, on the one hand,
authors such as McNair and Fitzmaurice fervently supported the idea of
jus cogens,25 other writers, in particular Sereni and Suy, were reluctant to
embrace this doctrine, opposing the submission of treaties to moral
norms 2 6 and arguing that the conditions of existence ofjus cogens, i.e. of
an international public order, had not yet materialized.27
Despite the controversy and uncertainties surrounding this concept,
by 1966, the International Law Commission had included two provisions
relating to jus cogens in its draft Convention on the Law of Treaties.
19. Those authors include notably Hyde, Hall and McNair. See George D.
Haimbaugh, Jr., Jus Cogens: Root and Branch (an Inventory), 3 TOURO L. REV. 203, 20809 (1986-1987).
20. Alfred von Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in InternationalLaw, 31 AM. J. INT'L
L. 571 (1937).
21. Id at 572.
22. Id. at 576.
23. Id.
24. Rep. of the Int'l Comm'n, 15th Sess. Nov. 6, 1963, U.N. Doc. A/5601, para 18,
GAOR, 18th Sess. (1963).
25. See A. McNAIR, LAW OF TREATIES 215 (1961) (stating that "[t]here are,
however, many rules of customary international law which stand in a higher category and
which cannot be set aside or modified by contracting States"); Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice,
The General Principlesof InternationalLaw Consideredfrom the Standpoint of the Rules
of Law, 92 RECUEIL DES COURS 89, 120 (1957) (referring to jus cogens norms as
"obligations of an absolute character, compliance with which is not dependent on
corresponding compliance by others, but is requisite in all circumstances").
26. See Marjorie M. Whiteman, Jus Cogens in International Law, With a Projected
List, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 609, 615 (1977).
27. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Conference on International Law,
Lagonissi, April 3-8, 1966, Papers and Proceedings, The Concept of Jus Cogens in Public
International Law 85 (1967) (Summary Record).
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Those provisions were based on the idea that, since jus cogens norms
prevail over "ordinary" norms of international law, treaty provisions (or
entire treaties) which are contrary to such superior norms are void. Two
possible scenarios of conflicts between a treaty and a "peremptory norm
of international law" (this expression being synonymous to jus cogens),
which is defined as a norm "from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general
international law having the same character," were contemplated: first,
incompatibility at the time of the conclusion of the treaty (Article 37)28
and, second, the emergence of an incompatible jus cogens norm
subsequent to the conclusion of the treaty (Article 45).29
The drafters considered this definition of jus cogens norms
insufficient, notably because it did not include any indication of the
means by which the existence of ajus cogens norm could be established
in practice. From a more theoretical point of view, they expressed
dissatisfaction with the lack of anchorage of jus cogens in actual State
practice (positivism) and an unclear distinction of the legal concept of jus
cogens from purely moral rules. The drafters sought to remedy these
shortcomings by requiring that, in order for a rule to qualify as a
peremptory norm of international law, its non-derogable character and
aptitude to be modified only by a subsequent jus cogens norm be
"accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a

whole." 30
While this amendment helped to improve, to some extent, the clarity
of the concept of jus cogens, the notion of a peremptory norm of
international law remained far from unambiguous and "useable." It is
true that the International Law Commission provided additional guidance
by offering several examples of treaties that would be contrary to jus
cogens,31 which notably included treaties contemplating an unlawful use
of force and treaties involving the performance of international crimes
such as slavery and piracy. However, those examples do not remove
basic interpretive obstacles caused by tautology (a peremptory norm is a

28. Revised Draft Articles, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L LAW COMM'N 112, 120, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L. 117/Add. 1. Article 50 provides that: "A treaty is void if it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law ... "
29. Revised Draft Articles, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L LAW COMM'N 112, 122, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L. 117/Add. 1. Article 45 provides that: "If a new peremptory norm of general
international law ... is established, any existing treaty which is incompatible with that
norm becomes void and terminates." This provision has been adopted without changes
and can be found in Article 64 of the Vienna Convention.
30. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
31. International Law Commission Report, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 169,
247-49; 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 263, 409 (1967).
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norm that is recognized as peremptory) and overall-though deliberate
and probably unavoidable-vagueness.
One major uncertainty arises in relation to the meaning and role of
"the international community of States as a whole." As one of the
delegates pointed out during the Conference's second session in 1969,32
it is unclear whether acceptance by the international community as a
whole requires unanimous consent of all States or, alternatively,
acceptance by a mere qualified majority. In particular, given the analogy
with the formation of "ordinary" rules of customary international law,
the question arises as to whether it would be possible for a persistent
objector not to be bound by a particularjus cogens norm.33
The lack of clarity of the requirement of "acceptance by the
international community" and the more general definitional inadequacy
of the jus cogens concept leave vital questions pertaining to its content,
sources and formation largely unanswered and pose seemingly
insurmountable problems for its application in practice.34
Also,
considering the nature of arguably established jus cogens norms (such as
the prohibition of the use of force and the prohibition of slavery and
torture), it appears highly unlikely that States should enter into
agreements in violation of such norms or, at the very least, that they
should seize an international tribunal of possible violations of such
hypothetical agreements. It is thus not surprising that, in the course of
the thirty years following the entry into force of the Vienna Convention
in 1980, violations of jus cogens have rarely, and never successfully,
been relied upon in order to challenge the validity of a treaty.
Numerous defects of the concept of jus cogens and, more
particularly, its definition in the Vienna Convention have been pointed
out. Those defects refer, on the one hand, to the fact that the definition
of jus cogens gives rise to serious difficulties for its application in
practice (this is its "conceptual" weakness), both with regard to the
determination of its substance and with regard to the procedure by which
it is established. On the other hand, they refer to the absence of a
theoretical foundation of this concept, i.e. the fact that scholars fail to
agree on the assumption, approach, principle or idea on which it is based
(this is its "theoretical" weakness).

32. United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, Apr. 9-May 22, 1969,
Summary Records of the Plenary Meeting, 94 11, U.N. Doc. (A/CONF.39/1 I/Add. 1).
33. See Andreas L. Paulus, Jus Cogens in a Time of Hegemony and FragmentationAn Attempt at a Reappraisal,74 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 297, 308 (2005) (At the Conference,
the French delegate formulated a proposal to insist on the possibility of persistent
objection but failed to find meaningful support.).
34.

See Conference,

THE CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,

Lagonissi Conference on Int'l L., (1966) (comment made by Georges Abi-Saab).
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Jus Cogens as a Set of Norms Lacking Substance

The concept of jus cogens, such as it has been formulated in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, fundamentally lacks a
substantive definition. Article 53 of the Convention, which defines ajus
cogens rule as "a norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm ...
having the same character," "defines" jus cogens by reference to the
consequences deriving from the jus cogens character of a norm, namely
the fact that such norm cannot be derogated from and not be superseded
by another norm, except for a newly-established jus cogens rule. Such a
definition does not offer any useful indication as to the substance of jus
cogens.
Insofar as it provides, in essence, that a peremptory norm is a norm
that is considered as peremptory, Article 53 is also largely tautological.
No references to specific interests or values of the international
community of States such as peace, security, and the protection of human
rights, for example, are contained in the definition of the Vienna
Convention. Also, although the International Law Commission's
commentary includes a few illustrations of jus cogens norms,35 no
"official" examples of such norms have been provided in the
Convention.
Admittedly, it is a difficult task to draft a substantive definition of
36
the concept of jus cogens. Moreover, it may be undesirable to adopt a
definition by reference to specific interests or rights to be protected, as
this may lead to an undue confinement of the concept of "peremptory
norm." In fact, similarly to the notion of domestic public policy, the
contents of jus cogens presumably evolve, and it would thus be
inappropriate-and largely counterproductive-to establish conceptual
boundaries that would hinder the "natural" evolution of the concept of
jus cogens.
Whether the absence of any substance of the notion of peremptory
norm is deliberate or merely the result of failure to agree on a more
detailed definition, it seriously undermines attempts to apply this concept
35. Id.
36. See Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in InternationalLaw, 100 AM. J. INT'L
L. 291, 291 (2006). Solving the problem of adequately defining jus cogens as a rule of
international law constitutes a task that is specific to the international legal system. In
fact, in the domestic legal order, the non-derogable character or "superiority" of a norm,
if it is not expressly provided for, generally derives from the nature of its source and is
thus easily ascertained. Thus, norms that are enshrined in the Constitution prevail over
"ordinary" laws; in the context of the European Union, norms decreed by the European
Council prevail over the laws of the Member States.
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in a meaningful and coherent fashion. It is thus understandable that a
number of scholars should have focused their attention on narrowing
down, or substantiating, jus cogens. While some authors haverightly-pointed out the basic interests that jus cogens norms seek to
preserve,37 others have suggested sets of criteria that a rule must satisfy
in order to qualify as such a norm. 38
Regrettably, those few legal scholars who have attempted to define
jus cogens by reference to a set of specific criteria or requirements do not
agree on a single definition, notably because they fail to agree on
whether to include the actual non-derogability of peremptory norms as a
definitional criterion. Moreover, several of the suggested criteria are
either vague ("a foundation in morality") or do not clarify the meaning of
certain expressions used in the Vienna Convention ("acceptance by the
international community of States" is not explained satisfactorily). Thus,
no generally accepted and workable definition ofjus cogens exists, nor is
such a definition likely to emerge in the near future.
3.

Jus Cogens as a Set of Norms Lacking a Procedure for Its
Determination

As it does not include any substantive definition of the concept of

jus cogens, Article 53 of the Vienna Convention necessarily focuses on
its "procedural" dimension, i.e. the process by which jus cogens norms
Indeed, Article 53 lays down the requirementare determined.
sometimes referred to as "double consent" 3 9-according to which a
peremptory norm of international law must be accepted by the
international community of States. Such acceptance, although it can be
expressed as a single requirement, has a twofold aspect: acceptance of a
given rule as a norm of international law and acceptance as a norm ofjus
cogens (i.e. acceptance of its non-derogable character and limited
replace-ability).
While Article 53 emphasizes the crucial role of the international
community of States, it nevertheless remains silent with regard to the
37. See Haimbaugh, supra note 19, at 212 (The author distinguishes two main
branches of jus cogens norms: security and independence of States on the one hand, and
individual rights on the other).
38. See Gangl, supra note 10, at 64 (According to this author, ajus cogens norm is
characterized by (1) a foundation in morality; (2) importance to international peace and
order; (3) general acceptance in the international community of States; and (4) the fact
that it serves global interests rather than interests of individual State). See also Uhlmann,
supra note 10, at 104 (This author includes the legal regime governing jus cogens norms
in her definition. She claims that a peremptory norm of international law must (i) protect
an interest of the community of States, (ii) be founded in morality, (iii) have an
"absolute" character, and (iv) be accepted by the international community.).
39. See Uhlmann, supra note 10, at 112.
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modalities and the extent of the required "acceptance." A basic question
that has been posed in this respect relates to the "source" of peremptory
norms of international law. In fact, considering the similarity between
the procedural aspect ofjus cogens and the requirements of State practice
and opiniojuris, i.e. the constitutive elements of customary international
law, many authors claim or assume that jus cogens norms are necessarily
rooted in custom. However, it is not inconceivable forjus cogens norms
to derive from treaties or general principles of law; nor can it be
excluded that such norms may derive from non-traditional sources of
international law which are not listed in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute.40
As has been mentioned, another fundamental question that arises in
relation to the process envisaged in Article 53 pertains to the extent of
the required acceptance by the international community of States. In
particular, it is debatable whether, in order to qualify as jus cogens, a
norm must be accepted by all States of the international community
(universal acceptance) or merely by a (presumably large) majority of
those States (majority acceptance). For reasons that are not entirely
clear, and at least in part on the basis of an analogy with the process by
which customary rules of international law emerge, most scholars
assume that majority acceptance is sufficient. 4 1 However, the opposite
view may be, and has been, argued, especially in light of the fact that the
"absolute" character of ajus cogens norm suggests a higher threshold of
consent than the one applying to customary rules.
Lastly, although Article 53 conditions the jus cogens nature of a
norm upon State acceptance, the relevant determinations will ultimately
occur in the context of the judicial process. In other words, whether a
rule constitutes a jus cogens norm or not will need to be decided by a
(more often than not international) tribunal and, most frequently, the ICJ.
Such decisions give rise to the classical legitimacy concerns voiced with
respect to judicial lawmaking, a criticism that is particularly relevant in
relation to norms which, unlike customary international law rules,
potentially bind persistent objectors.

40. It may, in fact, be argued that jus cogens, inasmuch as it is not based on State
consent, constitutes a distinct source of international law, independent of treaties, custom,
and general principles of law.
41. See infra, II.A.3.
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Jus Cogens as a Set of Norms Lacking a Proper Theoretical
Basis

The uncertainties affecting the definition of the concept of jus
cogens norms are rooted, at least in part, in the absence of a solid
theoretical foundation. In fact, the general recognition of a specific
theory underlying the concept and effects ofjus cogens would provide
answers to a number of questions that remain, at present, unsolved. If,
for example, the theoretical basis for jus cogens were to be found in the
actual or presumed consent of States, then this might lead to the
conclusion that universal acceptance is required for ajus cogens norm to
be established or, alternatively, that a non-consenting State is not bound
by a particular peremptory norm of international law.
The absence of a proper theoretical basis ofjus cogens can be traced
back to the negotiating and drafting history of the Vienna Convention.
During the Conference, the major dividing line separated the supporters
of a natural law approach, i.e. of the idea that certain fundamental rules
are derived from reason or "nature" and need not expressly be "adopted"
in order to constitute law, from the positivists who essentially equate law
with rules that are enacted through the formal channels of the lawmaking
process. Understandably, the positivists objected to the very concept of
jus cogens, rejecting the inappropriateness of merging law with morality
and criticizing the vagueness of natural law concepts. Arguably, the
final version of Article 53, which incorporates a "positivist" reference to
the acceptance of jus cogens by the international community of States,
represents a compromise between the two approaches. 4 2
In addition to natural law and positivism, the idea of an international
public order has often been put forward as a theoretical basis for jus
cogens. Proceeding from an analogy with the domestic legal order, such
theory posits that the international community of States, like the subjects
of the domestic legal system, shares a number of common (moral) beliefs
and basic interests which constitute the basis of the normative system.
Although submittedly accurate, the international public order theory is
frequently criticized on the grounds that the analogy with domestic
public policy is flawed in several ways.43
As a result of the perceived inadequacy of natural law, positivism
and the domestic public order analogy, some authors have attempted to
42. See Haimbaugh, supra note 19, at 205.
43. See, e.g., Weisburd, supra note 6, at 25-26 (mentioning, inter alia, the lack of an
institutional structure of the international legal system permitting coherent formulation
and enforcement of jus cogens norms and the specificities deriving from the fact that the
subjects of international law are States and not individuals).
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suggest new theoretical approaches explaining the various alleged effects
ofjus cogens. The most prominent such attempt consists of the fiduciary
theory of jus cogens argued by Criddle and Fox-Decent. According to
the authors, the State and its institutions, as a consequence of the powers
vested in them by the subjects of the domestic legal system, owe a
corresponding fiduciary duty to those subjects. One of the principal
obligations included in this duty arguably consists of compliance with jus
cogens.
To date, the fiduciary theory, regardless of its potential merits, has
not had a noticeable impact on scholarship or legal practice.
Disagreement on whether, and the extent to which, jus cogens is based
on natural law, positivist or public order approaches continues to
compromise not only a basic understanding of this doctrine, but also its
coherent application in practice.
B.

The LimitedRelevance of Jus Cogensfor the Law of Treaties: Rare
and Unsuccessful Reliance on Jus Cogens in the Context of
InternationalDisputes Relating to the Validity of a Treaty

An empirical study of the application of the concept of jus cogens
by international (or domestic) tribunals as a grounds invalidating a treaty
requires, as a preliminary matter, a general understanding of the nature of
potential jus cogens "issues" that may arise, as well as of the probable
fora in which the relevant disputes may be heard. In fact, though this
possibility is not expressly provided for in any international instrument,
the concept of jus cogens may be, and is, relied upon in a variety of
contexts.44 Also, while it is rather unproblematic to assume that disputes
pertaining to the validity of a treaty, which are essentially public
international law disputes, are generally brought before the ICJ, disputes
involving violations of individual "jus cogens rights" are more likely to
be argued in domestic courts and/or international human rights tribunals.
Also, it is worth clarifying that jus cogens "cases" do not always
involve resort to the concept of jus cogens. Domestic or international
tribunals may have recourse to similar notions such as fundamental rules,
international public order or obligations erga omnes. This latter category
of norms was established by the ICJ in its 1970 decision in Barcelona
Traction in which the Court defined obligations erga omnes as those that
are owed "towards the international community as a whole". 45 In light of
the fundamental nature of such obligations, the alleged consequences
flowing from their erga omnes quality, and the examples provided by the
44. See infra, I.C.
45. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain),
Judgment [1970] I.C.J. 3, 32, T 34 (Feb. 5).
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Court, it is safe to conclude that the concepts of jus cogens norms and
erga omnes obligations are related and overlapping; 46 a recent decision
of the ICJ even suggests that they are identical.47 Also, the ICJ may
deliberately avoid using the controversial term jus cogens, as it did in its
Advisory Opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case, which referred to
"intransgressible principles of international customary law,"A8 rather than
jus cogens norms.

Essentially, one can distinguish three types of cases involving the
application, or rather, a reference to the concept of jus cogens. The first
category includes those cases in which a court or tribunal refers, often in
an obiter dictum, to a specific rule as being ajus cogens rule, without any
direct effect on the actual outcome. The second group of decisions
includes those cases in which the allegedjus cogens character of a norm
is relied upon to seek a result different from a holding of invalidity of a
treaty. The third category, which is directly relevant for the present
analysis, comprises the very few cases where the validity of a treaty, or a
treaty provision, is challenged on the grounds of an alleged jus cogens
violation.
The probably best-known example of a case falling within the first
category is the ICJ's decision in Military and ParamilitaryActivities in
and Against Nicaragua.4 9 In this case, Nicaragua argued that the United
States, by supporting the operations and activities of a paramilitary rebel
group in Nicaragua, had violated the international law rule prohibiting
the use of force between States. When examining the question of
whether the prohibition of the use of force in fact constituted a norm of
international law, the ICJ relied upon the jus cogens character of the said
prohibition, as an a fortiori argument establishing its status as a rule of
customary international law.so It is unclear whether, in addition to the

46. See Michael Byers, Conceptualizing the Relationship between Jus Cogens and
Erga Omnes Rules, 66 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 211 (1997) (One author recently suggested that
all jus cogens norms are necessarily also erga omnes obligations, while the opposite is
not true.).
47.

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian

Territories, Advisory Opinion 2004 1CJ43; see also Andrea Bianchi, Dismantling the
Wall: the ICJ's Advisory Opinion and its Likely Impact on International Law, 47
GERMAN YBK. INT'L L. 343 (2004).
48. Legality of the Threat or Use ofNuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion [1996] ICJ
226, 79.
49. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
50. Id. at 100-01, 113-15 (opinion of the Court).
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prohibition of the use of force, any other rule of international law has
been labeled ajus cogens norm by the lCJ.51
As far as the second category is concerned, the majority of the
relevant cases, which are mostly brought before domestic courts, involve
allegations of human rights violations and the legal argument that the jus
cogens nature of the rights at stake should entail a waiver of the
sovereign immunity of the defendant State. While the courts of most
countries, as well as the European Court of Human Rights, have refused
to waive sovereign immunity in the face of such allegations, the courts of
other countries, including Greece and Italy, have been more receptive to
such arguments. 52
The third category of cases, which is of particular relevance for the
argument developed in this Section, comprises a handful of disputes in
which the invalidity of a treaty or treaty provision was alleged, or at least
contemplated, on the basis of ajus cogens violation. Amongst those are
at least two early cases, i.e. cases related to disputes that have arisen
(well) before the adoption of the Vienna Convention. As early as 1923, a
judge of the PCIJ, in his dissenting opinion in the S.S. Wimbledon case,53
took the view that a provision of the Peace Treaty of Versailles of 1919
was not valid since it violated the right of third parties-those rights
being arguably ofjus cogens nature.54 The second dispute, which did not
give rise to a judicial ruling, consisted of allegations made by Cyprus
that certain provisions of a treaty it had concluded with Greece, Turkey
and the United Kingdom, insofar as they established a right of unilateral,
possibly armed, intervention in Cyprus, violated the jus cogens norm
prohibiting the use of force. 5
In the post-Vienna Convention era, apparently only one decision of
the ICJ addresses the invalidity of a treaty provision on the grounds of an
alleged jus cogens violation. In Armed Activities in the Territory of the
Congo between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda,56
the ICJ had to rule on the Congo's argument that Rwanda's reservation
to Article IX of the Genocide Convention-which provides for
jurisdiction of the ICJ-was invalid since it violated the prohibition of
51. See Haimbaugh, supra note 19, at 223. The jus cogens nature of a number of
other rules has been discussed or accepted, mainly in dissenting and separate opinions of
individual judges of the ICJ.
52. The impact of the concept of jus cogens on the availability of the sovereign
immunity defense is examined in more detail infra, I.C.3.
53. See Case of the S.S. "Wimbledon" (U.K., Fr., It., & Japan v. Ger.), 1923 P.C.I.J.
(Series A) No. 1.
54. See Schwelb, supra note 5, at 950.
55. Id. at 952.
56. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda),
2006 I.C.J. 37 (May 28) (on jurisdiction and admissibility).
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genocide, allegedly a jus cogens norm. While not denying such jus
cogens character of the norm at stake, the Court held that it did not
suffice to found the Court's jurisdiction, which is always based on the
States' consent.57
More than forty years after Schwelb's observation that "[t]here
appears to be no case on record in which an international court or arbitral
tribunal decided that an international treaty was void because of
repugnancy to a peremptory rule,"58 the status quo evoked by this author
has remained unchanged. In reality, the limited relevance of jus cogens
for the law of treaties is hardly surprising. First of all, as I have
mentioned, the conclusion of treaties violating fundamental norms of the
international community is rather implausible; violations of such norms
are more likely to be caused by other acts attributable to a State. In
addition, the uncertainties regarding the sources and content of jus
cogens, which create a risk of unpredictable, incoherent and arbitrary
decisions, explain the reluctance of international tribunals to apply this
concept.
C. The InappropriateAttempts to Extend the Reach of the Jus Cogens
Concept Beyond the Scope of the Law of Treaties
Although the notion of jus cogens has only been expressly
recognized in the context of the law of treaties, attempts have been made
to apply this concept by analogy in other areas of international law. In
part, this is due to the lack of any significant impact on the practice of the
law of treaties. To a considerable extent, however, attempts to extend
the scope of application of jus cogens aim to draw "logical"
consequences from the superior normative status of jus cogens rules.
Thus, they are based on the idea that, in addition to their non-derogability
in the law of treaties, norms of jus cogens need to benefit from other
forms of enhanced protection.
More specifically, attempts to apply the concept of jus cogens by

analogy have been made in relation to at least three categories of issues.
In fact, jus cogens has notably been relied upon as (i) a justification for
the exercise of universal jurisdiction, (ii) the underlying rationale for the
adoption of specific norms governing State responsibility, and (iii) a
grounds upon which a State's sovereign immunity defense may or should
be waived.

57.

Id. 64.

58. See Schwelb, supra note 5, at 949-50.

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

250

[Vol. 29:2

As I will explain, most of these attempts have been largely
unsuccessful. To the extent that they were, at least in part, successful, I
submit that those efforts were nevertheless uncalled for.
In fact, the conceptual and theoretical defects of the notion of jus
cogens-which partly account for the lack of recourse to this concept as
a rule of the law of treaties-inevitably affect the workability of any
conceivable jus cogens-based rule, regardless of its particular field of
application.
Yet, it is necessary to clarify that principles such as universal
jurisdiction or specific rules on State responsibility are not inadequate.
On the contrary, they may be desirable and in conformity with the
purposes of, and "vision" expressed by, the concept of jus cogens.
However, due to its inherent vagueness and ambiguity, jus cogens does
not constitute the adequate "tool" or "vehicle" for the introduction of a
specific, particularly protective, legal regime applying to such
fundamental norms. Properly understood as a symbolic concept carrying
a particular vision of the international legal order,jus cogens should not
be viewed as a legal rule, but rather as a theoretical and ideological basis
for the further development of international law.
1.

Inappropriateness of Asserting Universal Jurisdiction over Jus
Cogens Violations

The principle of universal jurisdiction (or universality principle),
similarly to the passive personality and protective principles, constitutes
an exceptional basis for a State's exercise of adjudicatory (essentially
criminal) 59 jurisdiction. It is justified by the perceived practical necessity
to ensure that particularly "serious" or "grave" offenses do not remain
unpunished,60 an otherwise probable scenario when the place of
commission of a crime does not fall within the territorial sovereignty of
any State61 or when the crimes perpetrated are, for political reasons,
59. However, it is sometimes argued that the principle of universal jurisdiction
should be extended to cover civil claims based on "heinous conduct proscribed by
international law". See Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, Notes and
Comments-The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction,100 AM. J. INT'L
L. 142 (2006).
60. See Georges Abi-Saab, The Proper Role of Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 596, 599 (2003) (stating that universal jurisdiction has traditionally been
regarded as a "jurisdiction of last resort, a fail-safe solution called for by urgency and
necessity.").
61. This problem most frequently arises in relation to cases involving piracy. See,
e.g., id at 599: "Piracy is a criminal act that takes place in a space where there is no
overall territorial sovereignty. A State [which captures a pirate] may have no other
connecting factor with the acts of piracy or the pirate . . . except for being the place of
capture."
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unlikely to be prosecuted in the country where they have been
committed. 62 From a more theoretical point of view, the principle of
universal jurisdiction finds support in the idea that the crimes concerned
are so "serious" that they offend not just the national or territorial States,
but the international community as a whole. 63
Considering the nature of the legal violations that arguably give rise
to universal jurisdiction," it is easily understandable that this type of
jurisdiction should have been linked to the concept of jus cogens. In
fact, a number of scholars seem to support the proposition thatjus cogens
violations are subject to universal jurisdiction. 65 Taking a more nuanced
position, some writers argue that only some peremptory norms of
international law justify the exercise of universal jurisdiction, while
others do not. 6 6
However, as far as the actual practice is concerned, there seem to be
very few-or no-cases in which domestic courts have expressly based
their jurisdiction on the idea that the jus cogens nature of the alleged
violations justifies resort to the universality principle. In part, this is due
to the fact that it is generally not necessary to invoke jus cogens in order
to establish jurisdiction over specific acts. In fact, not only do many
courts affirm universal jurisdiction over a variety of acts such as piracy,
war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and torture (i.e. it is not
necessary to rely on the broad concept of jus cogens), but it is also
frequently unnecessary to claim universal jurisdiction insofar as
jurisdiction may be established on the basis of other principles. 67
Another factor calling into question the necessity of claiming
universal jurisdiction over jus cogens violations consists of the
availability of a growing number of international conventions providing
for quasi-universal jurisdiction over crimes falling within their scope of

62. Id. at 600.
63. See Bartram S. Brown, The Evolving Concept of Universal Jurisdiction,35 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 383, 383 (2001) (stating that according to a generally accepted view, the
commission of such crimes renders their offenders "enemies of all humankind").
64. The identification of those acts or crimes that give rise to universal jurisdiction
under customary international law is a matter of some debate. While most authors agree
that piracy, slave trading, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity fall within
the scope of this doctrine, the applicability of the universal jurisdiction principle to acts
such as terrorism and drug-trafficking is not uncontroversial.
65. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 15; Mitchell, supra note 15; and Rubin, supra
note 15. See also MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 673 (6th ed. 2008) (stating
that "[tihe view is sometimes put forward that where a norm of jus cogens exists,
particularly where the offence is regarded as especially serious, universal jurisdiction as
such may be created").
66. See, e.g., Mitchell, supra note 15, at 230-31.
67. In particular, jurisdiction may be claimed on the basis of the passive-personality
principle which confers jurisdiction on the national State of the victim(s).
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application. Those conventions cover a variety of offenses including, for
example, hijacking, 6 8 hostage-taking, 69 and torture. 70 In addition, a
number of substantive jus cogens violations have been, and can be,
brought before ad hoc international criminal tribunals and the
International Criminal Court.
Not only is reliance on the concept of jus cogens frequently
unnecessary in order to establish jurisdiction over specific crimes, but it
is also detrimental to the predictability and coherence of domestic court
decisions. In fact, the inherent conceptual flaws and vagueness of jus
cogens invite an arbitrary exercise of jurisdiction, a particularly serious
risk considering the political nature of many cases involving "juscogens
crimes".
2.

Doubtful Usefulness of Establishing Specific Rules of State
Responsibility for Jus Cogens Violations

Scholars have put forward a variety of views on the impact that the
notion of jus cogens may have on the law of State responsibility.
Orakhelashvili, for example, has discussed its effect on the three
principle forms of reparation, i.e. restitution, compensation and
satisfaction. 72 As far as the International Law Commission is concerned,
it has, in its Draft Articles on State Responsibility (the "Draft
Articles"), 73 formulated specific rules on the law of State responsibility
aimed at ensuring heightened protection ofjus cogens norms.
Those specific rules relate to a variety of issues and notably
comprise a rule prohibiting reliance on "circumstances precluding
wrongfulness" in an attempt to exclude the wrongfulness of jus cogens
violations, 7 4 rules establishing a specific regime applying to serious jus
68. See Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219; Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860
U.N.T.S. 105; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177.
69. See International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979,
T.I.A.S. No. 11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205.
70. See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
71. See infra, Part II.B.2.
72. See Orakhelashvili, supra note 15.
73. Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Rep. of Int'l Law
Comm'n, 53d sess, Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR,
59th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001).
74. See id. at Art. 26 (stating that "[n]othing in this Chapter [relating to
circumstances precluding wrongfulness] precludes the wrongfulness of any act of a State
which is not in conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general
international law.").
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cogens breaches,75 a provision conferring the right to invoke another
State's responsibility in the event of the violation of an obligation owed
to the international community as a whole, and a norm prohibiting the
violation ofjus cogens norms by way of a countermeasure.77
Although the objective of enhanced protection of jus cogens norms
is sensible, the specific rules laid down by the ILC in its Draft Articles
are, due to the conceptual and theoretical flaws of jus cogens,
problematic. In addition to the general problems resulting from the
vagueness of jus cogens, the provisions contained in the Draft Articles
suffer from "debatable positions," encounter reluctance from
international and domestic courts and are, at times, of questionable
necessity.
First of all, some of the rules adopted in the ILC's Draft Articles are
debatable. Though this question may not arise frequently in practice, it
can be asked whether certain jus cogens violations should not be
tolerated in circumstances involving "necessity." As Spiermann has
argued, the use of force may be justified, in specific circumstances, by
the "necessity" of humanitarian intervention. 7 8 More generally, one may
wonder to what extent the view expressed in Article 26 of the Draft
Articles takes account of the fact that the interests that a State claiming
necessity seeks to safeguard may themselves have a jus cogens

character. 79
Second, the practical impact of some of the provisions of the Draft
Articles may be limited due to a lack of proper acceptance and
application by domestic and international tribunals. The specific legal
regime applying to serious breaches of peremptory norms of
international law established in Articles 40 and 41, for example, has been
the subject of a rather confusing application by the ICJ. In fact, in its
Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Wall,80 the Court, although it endorsed
75. See id. at Art. 40 and Art. 41 (Under those provisions, in the event of a serious
breach of jus cogens, "States shall cooperate to bring [such breach] to an end" (Article
41(1)) and "[n]o State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by [such a] breach"
(Article 41(2).).
76. See id. at Art. 48 (providing that, in the event of a breach of an obligation owed
to the international community as a whole, "[a]ny State ... is entitled to invoke the
responsibility of [the breaching State]".).
77. See id. at Art. 50(l).
78. Ole Spiermann, HumanitarianIntervention as a Necessity and the Threat or Use
ofJus Cogens, 71 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 523, 543 (2002) (arguing that "necessity should not,
in advance and as a matter of principle, be rejected as an international law justification
for humanitarian intervention or other uses of force").
79. See Jorge E. Vinuales, State ofNecessity and Peremptory Norms in International
Investment Law, 14 LAW & Bus. REv. AM. 79 (2008).
80. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories,Advisory Opinion [2004] ICJ 200 (July 9).
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the concept and consequences of the regime established in the Draft
Articles, considered that such regime applied to erga omnes obligations
and not jus cogens norms, 8 ' thereby casting considerable doubts on the
scope of application of the relevant provisions.
The courts' reluctance to follow some of the provisions of the Draft
Articles may also be due to a certain lack of political "realism." In fact,
the provisions establishing a universal right to invoke another State's
responsibility for breaches of obligations that "are owed to the
international community as a whole" may encounter resistance from
international courts and, in particular, the ICJ. Moreover, the utility of
the right to invoke another State's responsibility in such circumstances is
severely limited by the consensual basis of the ICJ's jurisdiction.
Lastly, in various scenarios contemplated in the relevant norms of
the Draft Articles, it is not necessary to have recourse to the concept of
peremptory norms. For example, with regard to both the plea of
necessity under Article 25 and the taking of countermeasures in
accordance with Articles 49 to 51, the customary and conventional
requirement of proportionality excludes violations of jus cogens norms
(and notably the use of force), at least as a response to non-compliance
with "ordinary" norms of international law. Also, the proposition that
"no State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious
breach" of a jus cogens norm is implicit in a number of principles of
customary law.82
3.

Inappropriateness of Denying Sovereign Immunity in the Face
of Alleged Jus Cogens Violations

In addition to the areas of jurisdiction and State responsibility, the
concept of jus cogens has been relied upon in relation to the issue of
sovereign immunity. According to the proponents of the application of
jus cogens in this particular field, (allegations of) jus cogens violations
should lead to the unavailability of the sovereign immunity defense of a
defendant State. Thus, for example, a State should not be allowed to
"hide" behind its sovereign immunity in cases involving allegations of
serious human rights violations.
The theoretical basis of this theory-which its partisans refer to as
the "normative hierarchy" theory or the "abrogation" theory-lies
principally in the idea of the normative superiority ofjus cogens norms
vis-d-vis the "ordinary" international law rule laying down the principle
of sovereign immunity of States and certain State-entities. Whether in
81. Id.159.
82. It is, for example, implicitly recognized by the rule prohibiting acquisition of
territory by unlawful occupation.
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connection with, or independently of, the argument of normative
superiority, some scholars argue that, where a State violates jus cogens
norms, it thereby waives its right to rely on sovereign immunity.
Depending on the specific context in which such conflicts between jus
cogens and State immunity arise, constitutional law arguments may also
be put forward in support of this theory.83
Interestingly, most writers who have published on this question are
proponents of the theory advocating the preemptive effect of jus cogens
84
on sovereign immunity. Those authors, who notably include Levy,
McGregor,85 Johnson,86 and Pavoni & Beaulac, express their views in
the form of a critical discussion of cases having denied such effect or, on
the contrary, in their approval of those-few--cases in which courts
have followed this doctrine.
To date, the courts of two countries, namely Italy and Greece, have
embraced the abrogation theory. In Ferriniv. The Federal Republic of
Germany, Mr. Ferrini, an Italian national, brought a claim for
reparation against the Federal Republic of Germany, alleging his forceful
deportation from Italy and being made subject to forced labor during
World War II. The Court, considering that the prohibition of forced
labor constitutes a peremptory norm of international law, held that such
norm trumped the "ordinary" customary international law rule of State
immunity and that, therefore, it had jurisdiction to hear Mr. Ferrini's
claim.
In Prefecture of Voiotia v. the Federal Republic of Germany,89 a
case involving a similar fact pattern, the Greek Supreme Court also held
that the defense of sovereign immunity could not successfully be invoked
by the Federal Republic of Germany. Contrary to the decision in Ferrini,
however, the Greek Supreme Court based its decision not on the
normative superiority of the allegedly violated norms, but on the idea
that a State which violates peremptory norms of international law must
be considered to have waived its right to rely on sovereign immunity in
relation to such violations.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See, e.g., Levy, supra note 13.
Id.
See McGregor, supra note 13.
See Johnson, supra note 13.
See Pavoni & Beaulac, supra note 13.
Cass Sez Un 5044/04, 11 Mar. 2004, reproduced in the original Italian text in 87

RIVISTA DI DiRITro INTERNAZIONALE 539 (2004).

89. Areios Pagos [A.P.] [Supreme Court] 11/2000, (Greece); Bernard H. Oxman,
Maria Gavouneli & Ilias Banterkas, Sovereign Immunity-Tort Exception-Jus Cogens
Violations-World War II Reparations-InternationalHumanitarian Law, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 198, 200-01 (2001) (translating the judgment of the Court).
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Not only is the precedential value of the case decided by the Greek
Supreme Court uncertain in light of the Court's subsequent case law, 90
but also, and more importantly, the courts of numerous other
jurisdictions have taken the view that allegations involving the violation
of peremptory norms of international law do not "trump", or entail a
waiver of, sovereign immunity. Those jurisdictions notably include the
United States,9 ' Canada 9 2 and the UK. 9 3 A similar view has been taken
by the European Court of Human Rights.94 Lastly, additional evidence
for the limited recognition of the "abrogation" or "normative hierarchy"
theory is provided by the position adopted by the International Law

Commission. 9 5
A number of reasons can be, and have been, invoked in support of
decisions denying the abrogative effect of jus cogens norms, beyond the
basic objection to the very concept of jus cogens. One author has
expressed the view that the idea of a conflict between jus cogens and
State immunity is inaccurate, since the latter rule is not properly speaking
an international, but a domestic law norm. 9 6 Other writers have
emphasized the fact that the abrogation theory would entail a
97
misconstruction and distortion of the applicable domestic Statute.
Several opponents of the application of the jus cogens concept in
relation to sovereign immunity have highlighted the incompatibility of
such a claim with international law, 9 8 arguing that there simply is no

90. See Areios Pagos [A.P.] [Supreme Court] 6/2002, (Greece) (ruling that,
according to a general norm of customary international law, a claim against a state for
tortures committed by its armed forces is inadmissible); see also McGregor, supra note
13.
91. See, e.g., Princz v. Fed. Republic of Ger., 26 F.3d I 166 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1121 (1995).
92. See, e.g., Bouzari v. Iran, [2004] D.L.R. (4th) 406 (Can.).
93. See, e.g., Al-Adsani v. Gov't of Kuwait, (1996), 107 I.L.R. 536 (1996).
94. See, e.g., Al-Adsani v. U.K., 35763/97 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2001).
95. U.N. Chairman of the Working Group, Convention on jurisdictionalimmunities
of States and theirproperty, 147, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/54/L.12 (Nov. 12, 1999) (stating that
the interaction between immunity andjus cogens norms "did not seem to be ripe enough
for the Working Group to engage in a codification exercise over it").
96. Caplan, supra note 13, at 765 (explaining that "[tlhe common law countries,
with their skepticism about state immunity's broad reach under international law,
generally prefer to regulate state immunities through the application of domestic
regulation").
97. See Johnson, supra note 13. While this author is in favor of the abrogation
theory, she implicitly admits that such a solution would be incompatible with the 1976
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act when she concludes that this piece of legislation needs
amending.
98. See, e.g., Zimmermann, supra note 13, at 433 (stating that the "denial of
immunity through amendment to U.S. statutes eliminating the granting of sovereign
immunity in cases of purported violations of international human rights would be ...
illegal under current public international law"(intemal footnote omitted)).
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basis for the proposition that a controversial theory should prevail over
an established international law norm such as the principle of State
immunity. Also, some authors have stressed that, from a practical point
of view, the denial of a State's sovereign immunity would be politically
"unwise." 99 Finally, some commentators have rightly considered that the
abrogation theory does not constitute a practical necessity, as a variety of
alternative procedural avenues including claims commissions, the
exercise of diplomatic protection and the seizure of an international
human rights tribunal, may be available. 00
Though fundamental, one objection to an application by analogy of
the jus cogens concept as a bar to reliance on State immunity has not
been put forward. Such objection is based on the fact that the two
allegedly "conflicting" rules, i.e. the norm prohibiting the violation of
peremptory norms of international law and the norm conferring
sovereign immunity upon States, cannot, from an intellectual point of
view, possibly be "in conflict." The inappropriateness of terming the
relationship between those two norms as a conflict is not due to the fact
that one constitutes an international and the other a domestic law normas has been suggested-but to the fact that those two norms are not of the
same "nature." More specifically, the norm prescribing compliance with
jus cogens constitutes a "substantive" norm pertaining to the content of a
legal obligation, while the sovereign immunity rule constitutes a
"procedural" rule restricting the scope of admissible claims. Logically,
the nature or seriousness of the violation of a substantive rule should not
have any bearing on the issue of jurisdiction, which is a distinct
preliminary question.
In light of the conceptual vagueness of jus cogens, the theoretical
weakness of the abrogation theory, and the practical reservations one
may raise as an objection to this theory, its limited practical success does
not surprise. The fact that, to date, the principle of sovereign immunity
remains largely unaffected by jus cogens provides another illustration of
the basic argument of this article, namely the idea thatjus cogens should
not be viewed, and cannot efficiently be applied, as a rule of
international law.

99. Id.
100. Id. at 435 (discussing, in relation to Princz v. Fed. Republic of Ger., 26 F.3d
1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the availability of a fund established in order to compensate
Holocaust victims that have not yet received adequate compensation).
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JUS COGENS AS A VISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE POST-VIENNA CONVENTION
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

In Part One, I showed that, due to its conceptual and theoretical
defects, jus cogens has had a limited impact on the actual practice of
international law. In the context of the law of treaties, it has largely
remained a theoretical construct. In other areas, and for similar reasons,
its application has been highly controversial and/or incoherent. This
does not mean, however, that the concept of jus cogens is useless. On
the contrary, although admittedly vague, it is the vehicle of a particular
"vision" of the international legal order and international law. By the
same token, it has considerably influenced, and continues to influence,
the post-Vienna Convention evolution of international law.
A.

Jus Cogens as a Vision of the InternationalLegal Order

Jus cogens is based on the idea that the international legal system
recognizes, or should recognize, a set of fundamental values. As a
consequence of this particular characteristic, the international legal order
envisioned byjus cogens presents two additional features. First, in order
for the underlying values ofjus cogens norms to be adequately protected,
the idea of their normative superiority needs to be recognized through the
acceptance of a hierarchy of norms of international law. Second, the
efficient protection ofjus cogens values also requires that those values be
upheld, where necessary, against State will. Through its vision of
international law as a hierarchical system which is not (exclusively)
based on State consent, jus cogens informs two long-lasting and
controversial debates on the nature and sources of international law.
1.

Jus Cogens as an Affirmation of the Existence of Fundamental
Values of the International Community

a)

The concept of Fundamental Values

Legal writings habitually discuss fundamental "norms" or "rules",
rather than values. If I prefer the concept of fundamental values, it is
because I believe it to be the more meaningful one. The greater
significance of the concept of value can be explained on the basis of the
relationships established between values, norms and rights. Values
constitute the underlying foundation of the normative system of any
given society or community (and arguably a nation-State) and are,
therefore, more "fundamental" than norms, i.e. they have a greater
sociological ability to define a society or community. If values give rise
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to norms, those norms, in turn, generate specific rights. Thus, for
example, the prohibition of degrading treatment (a norm) is based on the
dignity of the human person (a value) and gives rise to the corresponding
individual right not to be made subject to such treatment.
Being the underlying foundation of the normative system, values are
frequently not expressed as such; they are merely incorporated into legal
rules. Those legal rules that are aimed at ensuring the protection of
fundamental values are, by way of a consequence, termed "fundamental
norms." However, one and the same fundamental value may be
incorporated into, or taken into account by, several or numerous legal
norms. The fact that the latter may sometimes be in conflict illustrates
that "fundamentality" is primarily an attribute of a value, rather than a
norm. The prohibition of the use of force (a generally acknowledged jus
cogens norm), for example conflicts with the legitimate exercise of a
State's right of self-defense, even though both norms are largely based
on the same value(s).
When ascertaining the existence of fundamental values, it is
necessary, from a practical point of view, to identify fundamental
"norms" expressing such values. The existence of fundamental norms
implies that other norms (most norms) are devoid of this characteristic,
i.e. they are not fundamental, but merely "ordinary." The co-existence of
fundamental and ordinary norms gives rise to a relationship of normative
superiority of the former with regard to the latter.' 0'
Simply put, in the international legal system, there are two main
approaches by which fundamental values may be determined. First of
all, such values may be derived from the observation of the actual
practice of States. In other words, a value will be fundamental if it is
shared, and considered as fundamental, by all or most States of the
international community. Insofar as it focuses on the actual "reality," i.e.
on "how things are," such an approach can be termed a realist or
positivist approach. Its emphasis on shared perceptions of individual
States further suggests that this approach is "subjective," rather than
"objective."
According to the second approach, certain values are fundamental
because reason dictates such character, regardless of whether States
actually recognize their fundamental nature. For example, it could be
said that the value of human life, or of gender and racial equality, do not
need to be recognized or "confirmed" by individual States; they are
derived from reason, i.e. from the rational analysis of the conditions of
101. It is debatable to what extent such superiority is merely "relative" (fundamental
norms derive their superiority from the comparison with ordinary norms) or "absolute"
(the very nature of the value/norm requires superiority).
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human existence. Thus, the fundamental nature of a value does not
depend on State practice or "consent," the latter being merely the logical
consequence of the universality of human reason. Under such an
approach, State behavior is not constitutive of fundamental values; it
merely illustrates, and provides evidence for, the accuracy of the claim
that such values are derived from reason.
b)

Jus Cogens and Fundamental Values

The notion ofjus cogens, as envisaged by the drafters of the Vienna
Convention and relied upon before international and domestic tribunals,
unmistakably affirms the existence of fundamental values and norms.
This is evidenced, first of all, by the positivist aspect of the very
definition of the concept of jus cogens. As we have seen, under the
Vienna Convention, a jus cogens norm is defined as a rule that is
"accepted and recognized [as a jus cogens norm] by the international
community of States as a whole."l 0 2 By emphasizing the necessity that a
norm of jus cogens be accepted as such by the international community,
the Vienna Convention thus arguably adopts a "realist" or "subjective"
conception of fundamental values. 0 3
The recognition of fundamental values by the Vienna Convention is
not only implied in its definition of the concept of jus cogens but can also
be deduced from the legal regime of normative superiority it establishes.
In fact, under the Convention, jus cogens norms are non-derogable, i.e.
States may not enter into treaties that would be in violation of such
norms.104 Jus cogens norms, therefore, enjoy normative superiority with
regard to the other rules of international law. Such superiority derives
from their "fundamental" character and, as I will explain below, the
necessity effectively to safeguard the underlying values.
If the definition of jus cogens found in the Vienna Convention
expresses, to some extent, a positivist approach of fundamental values,
the two other "official" theoretical foundations ofjus cogens also support
the idea of the existence of fundamental values. First, the notion of
fundamental values is inherent in the natural law approach. 05 Indeed,
natural law thinkers argue that the existence of legal rules, or at least of
some of them, does not depend upon their formal recognition through the

102. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
103. See Giorgio Gaja, Jus Cogens Beyond the Vienna Convention, 172, RECUEIL DES
COURs 275, 284 (1981).
104. See Vienna Convention, supra note 102.
105. See Verdross, supra note 20, at 572-73.
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established channels of the law-making process. Instead, they can be
derived from "reason" and the observation of the "rules of nature."
Fundamental values also form part of the theories that equate jus
cogens with the existence of international public order.106 Although it is
frequently criticized, the analogy with domestic public order or "public
policy" adequately explains the essential function of jus cogens in the
international legal order. In fact, the concept of public policy, as it
applies in the domestic legal system, refers to rules that are, due to their
fundamental nature, non-derogable and thus beyond the reach of
contracting parties.
2.

Jus Cogens and the Necessity of a Hierarchy of Norms in
International Law

As a legal concept, the term "hierarchy" may be used in a broad and
in a narrow sense. The broad notion of hierarchy refers to a variety of
relationships that can be established between the different rules of a
given normative system and to the ways in which those rules can be
classified.10 7 The narrow concept of hierarchy-which is relevant for our
discussion-merely relates to one particular relationship between norms:
superiority (or inferiority).
The debate on whether international law is a hierarchical system,
i.e. a normative system that comprises rules situated at different
hierarchical levels (superior and inferior rules), has largely been
conducted in the context of the controversy between voluntarists and
natural law proponents regarding the sources of international law.
Indeed, one of the principal arguments against the existence of a
hierarchy of norms consists of the (voluntarist) allegation that all norms
of international law are derived from the will of sovereign States and
that, therefore, those norms are necessarily "equal." 0 8 Very similar
ideas have been expressed by those authors who rely on the traditional
perception of international law as a "horizontal" system in order to
establish the horizontality (i.e. equality) of the rules of this system.

106. See Alfred Verdross, Jus Dispositivum and Jus Cogens in InternationalLaw, 60
AM. J. INT'L L. 55 (1966).
107. See Martti Koskenniemi, Hierarchy in International Law: A Sketch, 8 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 566, 567 (1997). Although Koskenniemi views the question of normative
superiority as the central aspect of legal hierarchy, he nevertheless contemplates

alternative, though related, hierarchies (good and bad, valid and invalid, working and not
working).
108. PIERRE-MARIE Dupuv, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 14-16 (3d ed. 1995). See

also Prosper Weil, Towards Normative Relativity in InternationalLaw? 77 AM. J. INT'L
L. 413 (1983).
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In recent years, the idea of the existence of a hierarchy in
international law has been widely accepted and the debate has lost its
momentum.109 This is due to at least three reasons. First of all, it can
hardly be denied that States can create hierarchies between the various
international law obligations they assume. In fact, as early as 1945, the
UN Charter specified that its provisions prevail over incompatible
"ordinary" norms of international law."o While one could take issue
with the fact that such a hierarchy is merely "contractual" (i.e. only
binding upon signatories of the Charter), it cannot be doubted that the
Charter does, indeed, establish a valid normative hierarchy.
Second, the emergence of so-called "soft law" arguably suggests the
existence of a hierarchy of international law norms.'" Soft law refers to
a variety of legal instruments which, due to their particular wording and
in light of their drafters' intent, are non-binding. According to a number
of writers, soft law, insofar as it contains normative statements, must be
regarded as law. However, since it is not, strictly speaking, legally
binding, it is hierarchically inferior to other norms of international law.
This inferiority vis-A-vis "ordinary" rules of international law thus
arguably establishes the existence of a hierarchy of international law
norms.
The most convincing, and for our purposes most relevant, argument
in support of the existence of an international law hierarchy is based on
the concept of jus cogens.l12 Constituting by definition non-derogable
and superior norms, rules of jus cogens are situated at the highest level of
the international law hierarchy." 3 Regardless of whether jus cogens
norms actually exist, their acceptance as part of the international legal
order necessarily implies recognition of the idea of a hierarchy of norms
in international law.
Such a hierarchy is, in fact, necessary to safeguard the underlying
fundamental values thatjus cogens norms seek to protect. This hierarchy
of norms thus places jus cogens above other norms of international law
and, most importantly, beyond the reach of (possibly incompatible)

109. See, e.g., J.H.H. Weiler & Andreas L. Paulus, The Structure of Change in
International Law or Is There a Hierarchy of Norms in International Law? 8 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 545 (1997). The authors show that, regardless of the particular approach
followed, the quasi-totality of international law scholars accepts the idea of a hierarchy of
norms in international law.
110. See U.N. Charter art. 103 ("In the event of a conflict between the obligations of
the Members of the United Nations under the present charter and their obligations under
any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall
prevail.").
111. See Shelton, supra note 36, at 319-22.
112. See id. at 297-319. See also Weiler & Paulus, supra note 109, at 559.
113. See Koskenniemi, supra note 107.
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treaties. The necessity to ensure that jus cogens norms are not derogated
from by treaties reveals significant similarities between jus cogens and
the domestic public policy concept.1 4 In fact, both "rules" essentially
operate to limit the freedom of the subjects of the legal system to enter
into, and conceive, agreements. While the public policy rule limits the
"contractual freedom" of physical and legal persons of a given domestic
legal system, jus cogens imposes similar restrictions on the ability of
States to enter into, and design, treaties.
If the concept of jus cogens necessarily implies the existence of a
hierarchy of norms in international law, the relative uncertainty
pertaining to the "origins" of the fundamental values which jus cogens
norms aim to protect" 5 extends to the theoretical foundation of this very
hierarchy. It is thus debatable whether the hierarchy of international law
is based on the will of States or whether it exists independently of such
will. However, as I will show below, it is clear that consent can no
longer be considered as the unique source of a hierarchical normative
system of international law.
3.

Jus Cogens as a Limited Refutation of the Consent-based
Approach to the Sources of International Law

As several other writers have rightly observed, the recognition of
the concept of jus cogens informs the debate regarding whether State
consent can be regarded as the ultimate source of, or basis for, all norms
of international law (a view that is habitually referred to as
"consensualism" or "voluntarism").1 6 Naturally, the basic idea of jus
cogens contradicts, rather than supports, a consensualist approach of
international law." 7 However, the claims put forward by a number of

114. See, e.g., Christenson, supra note 8, at 598. Although this author is critical of
the municipal public order analogy ofjus cogens, he admits that "[a]t first glance," jus
cogens "resembles the override of private arrangements contrary to the public order in
municipal systems." He also acknowledges that such analogy constitutes the basis of the
jus cogens theories of several writers including Lauterpacht, McNair and Mosler.
115. Seesupra,II.A.I.
116. See Danilenko, supra note 9 (regarding the specific question of whether
customary international law is ultimately based on State consent); see Olufemi Elias, The
Nature of the Subjective Element in Customary International Law, 44 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 501 (1995) (assimilating the requirement of opiniojuris to State consent).
117. See Danilenko, supra note 9, at 47 (referring to the "apparent contradictions
between the idea ofjus cogens and the consensual nature of the formation of international
law"); see also Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo, Reflections on the Existence of a
Hierarchy ofNorms in InternationalLaw, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 583, 591 (1997) (stating that
"the introduction of the notion of jus cogens into treaty law has had the effect of causing
two antagonistic and perhaps even irreconcilable logics to coexist within the international
legal order: the traditional one of the subjectivism of horizontal relationships among
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authors according to which consent is largely (or entirely) irrelevant for
the formation of international law rules"' 8 are excessive. As I will show,
State consent may not be the only basis of international law, but it
undeniably plays a vital role in the creation of international law, even as
far as the establishment of jus cogens norms is concerned.
a)
The Debate on the Significance of State Consent: Voluntarism
Versus Natural Law
The controversy surrounding the "sources" of international law has
for a long time been associated with the confrontation between
voluntarists and supporters of a natural law approach.1 9 Although those
two approaches do not constitute the only theories relating to the sources
and, more generally, the process of creation or identification of
international law,120 their antagonistic views, which are centered on the
relative importance of State consent, are particularly insightful for our
analysis.
According to the voluntarist theory, international law is entirely a
creation of States, i.e. the members of the international community.121
International law being a horizontal system in which the legal subjects
are also the legislator(s), no alternative source of international law and,
more particularly, international legal obligations, can be conceived of
Also, attempts to identify such alternative sources are inappropriate. The
natural law approach, for instance, not only unduly confuses law and
morality, but also lacks a scientific foundation.122
equally sovereign states; and the revolutionary one of the objectivism inherent in the
notion of binding norms imposed on states").
118. See Alain Pellet, The Normative Dilemma: Will and Consent in International
Law-Making, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 22, 25 (1988-89) (observing, based on his
agreement with social theories of law, that "not only is State will no the basis of
international law, but ... it is a very misleading explanation of how international law
actually works").
119. Id.
120. Alternative theories are sometimes referred to under the label "social theories of
law."
See id. See, e.g., Oscar Schachter, The Evolving International Law of
Development, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 1 (1976) (one of the first applications of
social theory to the field of international law).
121. See Jos6 A. Cabranes, International Law by Consent of the Governed, 42 VAL.
U. L. REV. 119, 132 (2007) (stating that "consent lies at the heart of the making of
customary international law, just as it does with respect to treaty-based law"). See also
id at 140 (criticizing the fact that the "indeterminacy [ofjus cogens] invites development
or expansion that ignores the basic principle that a jus cogens norm must be based on
authentic systemic consensus", internal quotation marks omitted).
122. See Criddle & Fox-Decent, supra note 12, at 343 (observing that "[p]ositivists
argue that natural law theories of jus cogens artificially conflate law and morality,
confusing parochial and relativistic ethical norms with objective principles of legal right
and obligation.").
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Under a natural law approach, on the other hand, international law
is not based on State consent, but primarily on "reason." 23 11 other
words, the rules governing inter-State relations and the obligations of
States vis-a-vis each other can be derived, at least to a significant extent,
from rules of "reason." There is no need for States to create law, as it
suffices to "uncover" the universally valid rules of nature. The only role
that State consent can possibly play is to provide evidence of the
existence of a given rule of "natural law."
At first sight, the natural law approach may appear unrealistic: one
may wonder how every single norm of international law can possibly be
based on reason alone. However, to expect such "wonders" from natural
law would be a misconstruction of this doctrine. In fact, natural law
thinkers do not claim that any given provision contained in a treaty
concluded between two States necessarily derives from reason. Rather,
they argue that the legal validity and binding nature of such provisions
cannot be explained on the basis of consent and that only a principle of
natural law (such as pacta sunt servanda) can provide the necessary
theoretical foundation.
In a sense, natural law and voluntarism have both been able to
explain, and legitimize, specific developments of international law.
Natural law has, in the early stages of international law, served as a
useful theoretical underpinning of basic principles of the law of treaties.
Arguably, voluntarism appropriately describes international law in an era
of steady proliferation of treaties and other international agreements. In
more recent years, a variety of other theories explaining the origin and
validity of rules of international law-generally rejecting consensualist
approaches-have been elaborated.12 4
De lege lata, the consensualist doctrine, appears convincing. In
fact, the most authoritative definition of the sources of international law
(Article 38 of the ICJ Statute) can easily be regarded as a confirmation of
the consensualist theory. Indeed, the three main sources of international
law under Article 38 (treaties, custom and general principles) can each be
explained on the basis of State consent. If the consensual nature of
treaties is particularly evident, the consent-based character of customary
rules (which are "generally accepted" by States)12 5 and general principles

123. Id. The authors refer to Vattel's perception of natural law as "a universal natural
law of reason."
124. See Pellet, supra note 118, at 25. Those approaches are generally referred to as
"social" or "realist" theories.
125. See ICJ Stat. art. 38(l)(b) (referring to customary law as "evidence of a general
practice accepted as law").
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(which are "recognized by [all or a large number of] civilized
nations")126 can hardly be denied.
The PICJ's case law-which can be attributed to the ICJ-similarly
supports the consensualist approach. In the 1927 Lotus case (prior to the
adoption of the ICJ's Statute), the PCIJ, in an obiter dictum, formulated
its views on the origin of rules of international law. It observed that
"[t]he rules of law binding upon States [i.e. international law rules] ...
emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by
usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law."' 2 7
If Article 38 of the ICJ Statute and the PCIJ's observation in the
Lotus case both provide support for the consensualist approach, a number
of developments in the second half of the 2 0 th century-both doctrinal
and practical-have altered the terms of the debate and called into
question the preeminence of consent as the source of international law.
Whether it is sociological, "realist" approaches of international law 2 8 or
theories undermining traditional perceptions of State sovereignty, 29 they
all have contributed to the view that the will of States does not form the
(only) basis for rules of international law.
b) The Impact of Jus Cogens on Consensualism:
Rejection

A Limited

The fact that most authors agree that the concept of jus cogens
entails, in some way or another, a rejection of the voluntarist approach of
international law does not surprise. The prevailing view is, in fact, that
jus cogens need not be universally accepted-acceptance by a mere
majority will suffice-and that it therefore binds non-consenting
States.13 0 Jus cogens is thus incompatible with consensualism.

126. Id. at art. 38(1)(c).
127. 1927 PCIJ (ser A), No 10, at 18.
128. See, e.g., Pellet, supra note 116, at 25. Adopting a social theory approach, this
author argues that consent is largely irrelevant for the formation of international law. In
particular, he claims that consent is often unnecessary ("obligation without will"), id. at
33, and that conversely, consent is sometimes not sufficient to create law ("will without
obligation") id. at 27.
129. See, e.g., John A. Perkins, The Changing Foundations of InternationalLaw:
From State Consent to State Responsibility, 15 B.U. INT'L L. J. 433, 452-56 (1997).
130. See Gangl, supra note 10, at 76 (stating that "[A]rticle 53 [of the Vienna
Convention] does not require universal acceptance"); Danilenko, supra note 9, at 49
(concluding and deploring the fact that Article 53 of the Vienna Convention creates
"majority rule-making in the framework of the established sources [of international
law]"); Uhlmann, supra note 10, at 112 (observing that "[i]dentifying a norm as jus
cogens does not require recognition by each and every member of the international
community, but only the consent of a very large majority reflecting the essential
components of the international community.").
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More specifically, such a view can lead to two possible conclusions.
First of all, one may consider that whilejus cogens itself is not based on
State consent, this does not affect the consensual nature of the other
components or "sources" of international law (treaties, custom, general
principles). More radically, one could argue that the example of jus
cogens illustrates that, as a general matter, international is not based on
consent. It is not always clear whether specific writers subscribe to the
first or the second interpretation.
Arguing-as most scholars do-that a rule of jus cogens does not
require State consent (all States' consent) makes sense from a practical
point of view. In fact, the (un)declared purpose of the concept of jus
cogens lies precisely in its ability to impose specific duties on States
without the need to have those States accept the duties concerned. As
some authors have observed, if States are only bound by what they have
consented to, then one can hardly speak of "law."' 3 ' This observation
applies afortiorito jus cogens.
However, it would be exaggerated and wrong to conclude that
consent plays no role in the establishment of jus cogens norms. If jus
cogens constitutes, indeed, a rejection of consensualism, then such
rejection has limits. First of all, the impossibility for States to derogate
from jus cogens norms cannot be equated with a refusal of consent as the
basis for international law. In fact, the regime of non-derogability is a
consequence of a norm's jus cogens character and not an explanation of
its source. In other words, it would be illogical to state that, since jus
cogens norms may not be derogated from, and since they therefore
prevail over contrary agreements between States, jus cogens is not based
on consent.
Second, the idea that jus cogens norms are "accepted ... by the
international community of States as a whole" strongly suggests that a
rule cannot be considered asjus cogens if it is not recognized as such by
at least a significant number of States. While the reference to the
international community as a whole does not necessarily imply
acceptance by all States, it nevertheless seems to require the approval of
a (significant) majority of them.' 3 2 Thus, a universally valid norm ofjus
cogens would be based on the consent of a large majority of States.
Therefore, jus cogens is non consent-based only insofar as the will of a
majority of States binds the dissenting minority.
131. See Anthony A. D'Amato, Consent, Estoppel, and Reasonableness: Three
Challenges to Universal InternationalLaw, 10 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1969) (stating that
"[i]f the only way a defendant state can be held accountable to law is by proving that that
state consented to the particularrule in question, hardly any case could ever be won by a
plaintiff state.").
132. See Paulus,supra note 33, at 308.
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In reality, the determination of the true relevance of State consent
for the creation of jus cogens norms and international law more generally
encounters a fundamental obstacle. In fact, it is unclear, and almost
impossible to assess, to what extent State consent constitutes the cause or
merely the effect of the existence of a particular (jus cogens) norm. Does
the acceptance of a specific norm by the international community
"generate" such norm or does it merely provide evidence of its existence
(as a norm of natural law)?
While a final answer to this question may not be found without
solving, somewhat arbitrarily, the basic controversy between positivist
and natural law partisans, one fundamental conclusion can be drawn
from the confrontation of jus cogens and consensualism: jus cogens
implies the possibility for a State to be bound by a norm that it has not
accepted and, significantly (and in this respect jus cogens differs from
ordinary customary law), which it has expressly objected to.
B.

The Impact of the "Jus Cogens Vision" on the Post-Vienna
Convention Development ofInternationalLaw

The effects and repercussions of the vision of international law
contained in the concept of jus cogens are manifold. I do not claim to
provide an exhaustive and detailed examination of any of them; instead, I
will briefly review the main developments that can be considered as
having been facilitated by the acceptance of such vision.
It would probably be erroneous to link specific developments to one
particular aspect of the international legal order as it is envisioned byjus
cogens. Thus, rather than attempting to associate specific developments
with either the recognition of fundamental values, the existence of a
hierarchy of norms, or the possibility for States to be bound against their
consent, it is more sensible to adopt a holistic approach of the impact of
jus cogens.
1.

The Recognition of Individual Rights as Fundamental Values
of the International Legal Order

When the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was adopted
in 1969, it was neither established that the inclusion of a jus cogens
provision was aimed at the protection of fundamental "values," nor clear
what such values could possibly consist of-even though the
International Law Commission provided a few illustrations ofjus cogens
13
norms (or rather treaties that would be in violation of such norms).m
On
the contrary, doctrinal articles sometimes contained misleading
133.

See Haimbaugh,supra note 19, at 206.
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comments, apparently assimilating peremptory norms of international
law to general principles of law.' 34
However, the idea that the concept of jus cogens essentially aims to
protect individual rights has progressively found acceptance among
scholars. Academic writings onjus cogens have increasingly focused on
the protection of specific individual rights,13 5 or human rights more
generally.' 36 Thus, the initial State-centered approach of peremptory
norms of international law, which emphasized the need to preserve vital
State interests,'13 has given way to a more individual-centered notion of
jus cogens.
At the same time, scholars have started to understand that even
State-centered jus cogens rules, i.e. jus cogens norms that govern
relationships between States, ultimately affect individual rights. If, for
example, the prohibition of the use of force aims to preserve a State's
security and independence,' 38 such rule also protects the lives and health
of a State's citizens. Similarly, the classical examples of State-centered
norms such as the prohibition of colonialism and non-intervention in the
a significant individual
nc39
domestic affairs of other States ecompass
rights aspect.
More generally, the jus cogens debate has generated increased
awareness of the fact that those who are ultimately affected by
international law and the conduct of international relations are
individuals. This awareness is closely linked with the realization of the
largely fictitious character of the State as an entity independent of its
population. Wars, international disputes or economic sanctions between
States ultimately affect not the State as an abstract entity, but the

134. See Gangl, supra note 10, at 72 (stating that jus cogens norms are "generally
seen as those most basic to the international community, such as the principle of pacta
sunt servanda").
135. See, e.g., Allain, supra note 11; Spiermann, supra note 78; Stephanie L.
Williams, "Your Honor, I am here today requesting the Court'spermission to torture Mr.
Doe ": The Legality of Torture as a Means to and End v. The Illegality of Torture as a
Violation of Jus Cogens Norms under Customary InternationalLaw, 12 U. MIAMI INT'L
& COMP. L. REv. 301 (2004); Mitchell, supra note 15.
136. Pamela J. Stephens, A Categorical Approach to Human Rights Claims: Jus
Cogens as a Limitation on Enforcement? 22 Wis. INT'L L.J. 245 (2004); Andrea Bianchi,
supra note 47; Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law:
Custom, Jus Cogens and General Principles, 12 AUsT. YBIL 82 (1992); Karen Parker &
Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law ofHuman Rights, 12 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 411 (1988-1989).
137. See Haimbaugh,supra note 19, at 216 (referring to a study conducted by Sztucki
which shows, inter alia, that the initial "official" list of jus cogens norms was Statecentered).
138. Id. at 212.
139. Id. at 213.
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people.140 In a sense, this understanding has allowed the "veil" of
Statehood in international law to be lifted.
Over the past three decades, the subject of individual rights has been
addressed in numerous international conventions and agreements. As a
result, the status and rights of individuals are increasingly governed by
international law, rather than merely domestic law. Thus, international
law has played a pivotal rule in raising the level of protection of
individual rights across the globe, and efforts have been made to impose
compliance with such "international" standards by all States, whether
with or without their consent.
2.

The Enhanced Judicial Protection of Individual Rights

The recognition of individual rights as fundamental values of the
international legal system and the resulting idea of the existence of a
hierarchy of international law norms inescapably lead to the necessity of
providing for heightened protection of those rights. Due to its deterring
effect, the most significant feature of such protection consists of the
possibility to prosecute and try authors of "international crimes."'41
Significantly, it must be noted that, to some extent, the punishment of
international crimes has taken place without, and even against, the will of
the States concerned.
Enhanced judicial protection of individual rights under international
law comprises two aspects. First of all, it is based on the possibility for
domestic courts to exercise universal or quasi-universal jurisdiction over
certain crimes. As I have shown, although it is inappropriate directly to
apply the theory (and customary international law rule) of universal
jurisdiction to jus cogens violations, the principle of universal
jurisdiction is useful as such. In fact, it ensures that particularly serious
violations of individual rights will be punished whenever the acts at stake
are not captured by the traditional jurisdictional rules based on territory
and nationality or when the courts asserting jurisdiction unduly acquit the
alleged offender(s).1 42
It would of course be a distortion of reality to claim that universal
jurisdiction results from the acceptance of the jus cogens vision of
international law. Chronologically, the principle of universal jurisdiction
undeniably precedes the "official" recognition of jus cogens in the
Vienna Convention. However, in light of its basic implications, it cannot
be doubted that the idea of jus cogens has at least contributed to the
140. States do not die, suffer or starve; people do.
141. SHAW, supra note 65, at 430-40 (for an explanation of the meaning of
"international crimes").
142. See supra, ICI.
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growing acceptance of, and recourse to, as a matter of international
lawmaking, the notion of universal jurisdiction. In fact, as I have already
mentioned, a number of international conventions adopted after the entry
into force of the Vienna Convention establish quasi-universal
jurisdictional regimes. Also, the failed (and inappropriate) attempts to
associatejus cogens and universal jurisdiction have, interestingly, had a
beneficial impact on the acceptance of universal jurisdiction. Although
those attempts have not led to the requested broadening of the scope of
application of universal jurisdiction, the intense academic discussions of
this question have improved the perceived legitimacy of the universality
principle.
Universal jurisdiction is, of course, not an ideal rule, but rather a
rule of "necessity." In fact, as has been rightly pointed out, it constitutes
a "last resort" rule of jurisdiction, when all others fail.14 3 More
importantly, the exercise of universal jurisdiction entails the possibility
of undesirable "conflicts of jurisdiction," i.e. situations where the courts
of two or several countries claim jurisdiction over particular acts. This,
in turn, leads-at least in theory-to a violation of the double jeopardy
principle insofar as an accused may face a trial in country B after having
been acquitted in country A.
Since universal jurisdiction exercised by domestic courts does not
constitute an ideal means of enhancing the judicial protection of
individual rights, one must resort to alternative tools. Unsurprisingly,
those consist of the establishment of international tribunals enjoying
centralized jurisdiction with regard to specific acts (and/or events). Here
again, due to its wide and frequent discussion in relation to the creation
of such international criminal tribunals,14 4 the concept of jus cogens has
been instrumental as ajustification of such endeavors.
Historically, as is well known, the first examples of international
criminal tribunals are the Tokyo and Nuremberg Tribunals set up in the
aftermath of World War II. Having had as their principal task the
prosecution and punishment of genocide, war crimes and crimes against
humanity perpetrated by the German Nazi regime and the Japanese
armed forces during World War II, those pioneer tribunals have
sometimes been criticized for representing an illegitimate exercise of
"victor's justice." 4 5 In fact, not only were the authority and jurisdiction
of these tribunals doubtful, but also, and more importantly, the very acts
which they set out to punish did not, at that time, constitute established
143. See Abi-Saab, supra note 60, at 600.
144. See Shaw, supra note 65, at 126 (noting that "the rise of individual responsibility
directly for international crimes marks a further step in the development of jus cogens
rules").
145.

See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 454 (2005).
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norms of international law. Thus, the basic mission of those tribunals
implied a violation of the cardinal criminal law principle of nullum
crimen, nulla poena sine lege.
However, interestingly, no one (neither the authors of the crimes
concerned, nor German or Japanese officials at that time or more
recently) seriously challenged the legitimacy of the Tokyo and
Nuremberg Tribunals, even though they had been set up without, and
most probably against, the consent of the defeated nations. This lack of
opposition reflects the quasi-universal acceptance of the atrociousness of
the crimes perpetrated by the German and Japanese militaries as being
contrary to basicjus cogens norms of international law.
Another useful illustration of how international criminal justice
disposes of the requirement of consent of the (national State of the)
accused is provided by the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia. Set up with a view to prosecute and punish serious
violations of humanitarian law having occurred during the respective
conflicts, both tribunals have been established by Security Council
resolutions, 146 rather than international treaties, thereby rendering
47
unnecessary the consent of the States or entities concerned.1

As far as the International Criminal Court is concerned, it is well
known that it does not enjoy universal jurisdiction over the crimes falling
within its competence,148 even though the possibility of such jurisdiction
was envisaged during the negotiations of the Court's Statute. However,
the fact that the courts of any signatory of the Rome Statute may validly
exercise jurisdiction over acts committed in the territory of any (other)
signatory State or by a national of any such State significantly widens the
scope of jurisdiction of domestic courts. Also, it should not to be
forgotten that the International Criminal Court may be seized of a matter
by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and
that, in such circumstances, the national or territorial State does not need
49
to be a signatory of the Statute.1

146. See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993); S.C. Res.
827, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (as far as the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia is concerned). See S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
SCOR, U.N. Doc. S[RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (as far as the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda is concerned).
147. See SHAW, supra note 65, at 403 (explaining that the reason those tribunals were
set up by Security Council Resolutions was "to ensure that the parties most closely
associated with the subject matter of the war crimes alleged should be bound in a manner
not dependent on their consent").
148. Id. at 412.
149. See Rome Statute, I.C.C. Stat. art. 13(b), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (Jul. 1,
2002).
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CONCLUSION

As I have shown, due largely to a number of conceptual and
theoretical defects, jus cogens is of limited relevance for the actual
practice of international law. Thus, jus cogens does not properly
speaking constitute a (functioning) rule of international law. Rather, its
usefulness lies in the way it envisions the international legal order. Such
vision, as we have seen, consists of a normative system based on
fundamental values, characterized by a hierarchy of norms, and not
entirely dependent on the consent of the subjects of international law.
This vision has had a noticeable impact on the post-Vienna Convention
development of international law. Two examples of such impact are the
fundamental role played by individual rights and the growing judicial
protection of those rights.
In this article, I have only been able to sketch the effects of jus
cogens on the post-Vienna Convention evolution of international law.
Various other consequences, including heightened protection of human
rights (and notably the creation of human rights commissions and
tribunals) and humanitarian intervention without the consent of the
territorial State, have not been examined. The inclusion of such issues
would, in fact, have exceeded the scope of this contribution.

